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n standard debates on global justice, the sovereignty of 
peoples and moral concerns about a fair distribution of 
natural resources at the global level seem to be mutually 
exclusive. Proponents of peoples’ sovereignty generally insist on 
the significance of peoples’ free control over their resources. 
They argue that a global distributive regime should be very 
limited insofar as people living within a specific territory have a 
legitimate claim to it and to their own resources.  
Different versions of this argument have been articulated by 
statist scholars. For statism, a particular institutional setting – the 
liberal one – is the legitimate source of political authority. In 
general, the statists’ ideal of people’s sovereignty over their 
resources is founded on two features: the acceptance of peoples’ 
freedom to choose and support their institutional settings, and a 
commitment to anti-paternalism. One cannot tell free peoples 
what to do about their own resources within their own 
boundaries. Distributive concerns arise insofar as free institutions 
are not able to compensate for some structural conditions that 
are disadvantageous, arbitrary from the moral point of view (e.g. 
social lottery), and unjustly affect a proportion of the population.1 
From a statist point of view, although the distribution of natural 
resources across the world is a matter of luck, except in marginal 
 
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 
1971. 
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cases, well-functioning institutions are able to prevent that 
resource scarcity translating into poverty. There is therefore no 
need for a global distributive principle.2 Another version of this 
argument insists on the problem of coercion. States’ coercive 
actions, which should be justified on the basis of people’s ideal 
consent to them, require principles of fair distribution to 
compensate for the inequalities they create; yet, because natural 
resources are distributed across the world by chance and their 
distribution does not depend on any global coercive power, any 
such global distributive principle would be seen a form of 
coercion without consent.3 
In contrast, supporters of what we might call ‘moral 
cosmopolitanism’ argue that a global principle of equality should 
compensate for the unjust distribution of natural resources across 
the world.4 Proponents of this view generally consider the global 
distribution of resources as a matter of brute luck; some sort of 
compensation is morally required for those who live in 
unfortunate conditions.5 For some ‘moral cosmopolitans’, then, 
Western countries and international institutions owe a 
responsibility towards the global poor: the global market is in fact 
 
2 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
1999). 
3 Thomas Nagel, “The problem of global justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 
33(2005), pp. 113–47.  
4 Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitanism and global justice,” Journal of Ethics 9 (2005), 
pp 11–27; Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press 1979); Brian Barry, “Humanity and Justice in 
Global Perspective,” in J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds.), Nomos XXIV: 
Ethics, Economics and the Law (New York: New York University Press 1982), pp. 
219-52; Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity 
Press 2002). 
5 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations; Brian Barry, “Humanity 
and Justice in Global Perspective.” 
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the product of historical injustices that have created a 
fundamental asymmetry between a wealthy West and the rest of 
the world.6 Different views of ‘moral cosmopolitanism’ insist, 
however, on an alleged global ownership of natural resources, which 
should transcend state boundaries. As Beitz suggests, all moral 
cosmopolitans share the idea ‘that every human being has a 
global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern.’7 In this view, 
domestic and global justice exist on a continuum: natural 
resources belong to humanity and global institutions should be 
responsible for their fair distribution. 
Is it possible to reconcile traditional liberal commitments to 
both peoples’ freedom and anti-paternalism, typical of a statist 
view, with our moral concerns regarding a global economic 
system that is deeply unjust? In his fascinating book, Blood Oil, 
Wenar argues that the solution is so close to us that we fail to 
recognise it. To counter most of the injustices that characterise 
the global market, especially those caused by allegedly unjust 
resource ownership and control, we should appeal to and defend the 
principle of peoples’ sovereignty (or ‘popular sovereignty’, as 
Wenar puts it). This principle holds that ‘it is the people, not 
power, that should control a country’s natural assets.’8 Wenar’s 
analysis primarily focuses on ‘resource-cursed’ countries in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America where ‘resource-enriched regimes 
oppress their populations.’9 Responding to the situations there, he 
argues, necessitates redressing popular sovereignty at a global 
level. According to Wenar, it is possible to break the vicious cycle 
 
6 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights. 
7 Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitanism and global justice,” p. 17; Thomas Pogge, 
World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 169. 
8 Leif Wenar, Blood Oil: Tyrants, Violence, and the Rules That Run the World (New 
York: Oxford University Press 2016), p. xliv. 
9 Ibid. 
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of illicit power and burdened economies in these countries if 
liberal societies support their own values within their own 
boundaries. The Clean Trade scheme enables consumers, states 
and corporations to trade globally in accordance with a political 
principle which is widely supported by international law and by 
liberal thought – that is, the respect of peoples’ sovereignty.  
In this paper, I examine whether Wenar succeeds in providing 
a theory able to accommodate the statist commitment to peoples’ 
sovereignty without dismissing the cosmopolitan concern 
regarding a just global market. Contextualising Blood Oil within 
the broader debate on global justice and resource ownership, I 
focus on some specific aspects of Wenar’s Clean Trade scheme 
and explain why it comes to quite radical conclusions. Yet, if 
these conclusions are taken seriously, Clean Trade seems too 
demanding from the point of view of a statist account of justice. 
For cosmopolitans, too, the lack of normative justification for 
any alleged national resource sovereignty might weaken this 
position, especially for those who might oppose arguments to 
justify different forms of resource ownership. I will therefore 
discuss two problems with Wenar’s theory. First, I will show that, 
in spite of its statist premises, Wenar’s radical conclusions hardly 
pass the test of anti-paternalism. Is the Clean Trade scheme able 
to accommodate the demand of pluralism emerging in the Society 
of Peoples? Second, I focus on an issue that is neglected in 
Wenar’s book and which refers directly to the normative basis of 
resources ownership. I argue that this is a crucial issue, especially 
in contexts where the traditional idea of national sovereignty is 
contested, which often occurs in resource-cursed societies.  
 
I 
Resource Ownership and the Global Clean Trade Scheme 
Natural resources are distributed very unequally across the 
globe. Some countries are placed in territories with abundant 
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natural wealth (mineral, gas, oil, water, etc.), while others face a 
serious problem of resource scarcity and may even lack access to 
resources essential to human survival, such as clean water. Such 
an unfair distribution of resources is morally arbitrary: one should 
not be held responsible for being born in richly resourced 
Norway or poor and resource-scarce Malawi – this is obviously a 
matter of mere luck.10 To compensate for such injustices, a 
‘resource distribution principle’11 or forms of international 
taxation that extend the idea of ownership of natural resources to 
the global level seem to be needed.12 Yet, the abundance of one 
or more natural resources is not always a guarantee of wealth and 
prosperity. Rawls famously argued that, apart from rare cases, it is 
the political culture of a society, rather than its resources, which 
makes the difference in terms of economic outcomes and 
development.13 This is clear if we compare a relatively resource-
poor country, like Japan, with a resource-rich country, like 
Argentina: the economic performance of the former is greater 
than that of the latter regardless of the differences in resource 
distribution. In most cases, poverty is not in fact caused by 
scarcity of resources – in other words, it is not a matter of 
resource ownership; rather it is the product of several concurring 
elements including ‘the political culture, the political virtues and 
civil society of the country, its members’ probity and 
industriousness, their capacity for innovation, and much else.’14  
There is, however, another way to look at the problem of 
resource ownership which circumvents the thorny empirical 
 
10 Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitanism and global justice;” Brian Barry, 
“Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective.” 
11 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 141.  
12 Brian Barry, “Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective.” 
13 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples. 
14 Ibid., p. 108. 
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question of whether poverty is caused by an unequal distribution 
of resources among countries.15 One could argue that the reason 
for the weakness of some countries’ economies – especially those 
in Central and West Africa – is rooted in certain unjust historical 
conditions of power (e.g. colonialism) that have been perpetuated 
by the global market, its institutions and rules. Thus, although an 
unequal distribution of resources may be unimportant from the 
point of view of justice, the issue of resources ownership and 
particularly the historical ways in which resources came under the 
control of certain groups in certain countries is still morally 
relevant from the point of view of justice.16 
In Blood Oil, Wenar argues that a just account of resource 
ownership, which says that resources should belong to sovereign 
peoples, should be secured globally via a Clean Trade scheme.17 
For Wenar, the problem of several burdened states in Africa (e.g. 
Equatorial Guinea) is in fact the huge quantities of certain 
resources they own: not only do their economies suffer from 
being structurally dependent on these certain resources’ 
extraction and trade, but these activities are done under the strict 
control of authoritarian or violent regimes. In these contexts, low 
levels of economic performance are often related to institutional 
failure and increased likelihood of civil conflict. Economists and 
political scientists call this phenomenon the ‘resource curse’: it is 
the paradox that countries with an abundance of certain 
resources also show less propensity for economic development, 
democratic stability and institutional transparency.18 For Wenar, 
certain unjust power conditions, which characterise the global 
 
15 Chris Armstrong, Global Distributive Justice: An Introduction (London: 
Routledge 2012), p. 144. 
16 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights; Leif Wenar, Blood Oil. 
17 Leif Wenar, Blood Oil. 
18 Ibid., p. xv. 
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market, affect the ownership of the resources at the local level in a 
specific way. Global trade rules and institutions presuppose an 
international legal system based on ‘effectiveness’, premised on 
the idea that ‘whoever can seize it can sell it’. This principle ‘puts 
consumers into business with some of the world’s most violent 
and divisive men.’19 It is therefore necessary to break the vicious 
cycle that links consumers and corporations in the West in 
supporting the illicit power of criminals or dictators who have 
control over the resources in these countries. Wenar suggests that 
the well-known principle of popular sovereignty over natural 
resources should be redressed and the trade with these criminals 
should be prohibited via strict control over such trades with 
foreign countries and corporations.  
Blood Oil is sophisticated, well-argued and pathbreaking. It 
combines a rich empirical enquiry with a deep and convincing 
philosophical reflection. In addition, by avoiding the traditional 
discussion of whether resource ownership is a matter of brute luck, 
the argument seems to overcome some of the limits of the 
standard debate between statists and moral cosmopolitans 
regarding resource ownership and distributive justice. Wenar’s 
theory fits the desiderata of the statist account insofar as it seems 
to maintain a strong commitment to both peoples’ freedom and 
anti-paternalism. In the introduction, Wenar clarifies that his 
proposal asks Westerners to ‘enforce their own principles, within 
their own borders on their own soil.’20 In this sense, the proposal 
seems to embrace the pluralist premises of a statist account, à la 
Rawls, and to respect the Law of Peoples; Wenar reminds us that 
‘it is not for us to tell the Saudis or the Nigerians how to run their 
own countries (these are matters for the Saudis or the Nigerians 
 
19 Ibid., p. 76. 
20 Ibid., p. xxvii. 
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to decide).’21 But Wenar’s proposal is also meant to accommodate 
our moral concerns regarding global inequality: it suggests a 
strategy for redressing the historical injustices on which the global 
market rests.  
The proposal outlined in Blood Oil, however, is quite radical: it 
does not call for any sort of taxation or compensation for the 
unjust global trade; rather, it calls for the cessation of illegitimate 
resource trades and suggests a significant change in the global 
trade structure.22 Wenar admits that several concerns might be 
raised by his view. He lists three main objections: its high costs, 
the ‘first-mover fear’ and the ‘short-termism.’23 In light of these 
objections, are there still good reasons for supporting the Clean 
Trade scheme? First, although reform might be very costly, 
Wenar reminds us that a Clean Trade system would provide 
compensations in terms of the increased trust of Western 
countries.24 Thus, the long-term advantages will help in 
overcoming most of the short-term difficulties, including the 
‘first-mover fear’. What Wenar calls ‘short-termism’ is undeniably 
a major obstacle for his theory. He provides a series of arguments 
for supporting a long-term perspective. In line with his theory’s 
anti-paternalist premises, Wenar is particularly concerned with 
securing good reasons for consumers and peoples in the West to 
invest in the Clean Trade agreement. The theory is, in fact, 
directed to consumers, states and corporations who share some 
moral premises regarding issues of basic justice and want their 
conduct to conform accordingly.  
Yet, is this enough to guarantee that the Clean Trade scheme 
will solve the problems in resource-cursed societies? What is its 
 
21 Ibid.  
22 On this point, see also Chris Armstrong, Global Distributive Justice, p. 150 
23 Leif Wenar, Blood Oil, p. 268 ff. 
24 Ibid., p. 271. 
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actual impact on these societies? The next sections will address 
these questions. I will show that when we consider the point of 
view of (non-Western) resource-cursed societies, the theory 
might ultimately reveal itself to be inconsistent with its anti-
paternalist and pluralist premises.  
 
 
II 
Anti-Paternalism and the Clean Trade Scheme: Between 
Globalism and Pluralism 
It is far less clear what the impact of Wenar’s proposal would 
be on the global poor and, especially, on resource-cursed 
societies. One could say that one important ‘short-term’ 
consequence of the Clean Trade scheme would be the exclusion 
from the global market of precisely those burdened societies who 
see their sovereign rights over their resources constantly violated 
by authoritarian and violent regimes.25 For these societies, the 
‘short-term’ consequences on living standards and poverty might 
make their condition of life worse than it was prior to the 
establishment of a Clean Trade framework.  
Paradoxically, then, a proposal that is aimed at redressing the 
problems with peoples’ sovereignty of resources has the effect of 
excluding precisely these resource-cursed peoples – at least in the 
short term. Would it be feasible to expect these peoples to 
prioritise a principle – popular sovereignty – over such basic 
needs as secure access to food and water? Wenar might respond 
that this should not be a problem since the long-term consequences 
will be the incentivisation of good governance, which would 
certainly improve their life conditions.26 One could still object, 
 
25 Chris Armstrong, Global Distributive Justice, p. 150. 
26 Leif Wenar, Blood Oil, pp. 324-325. 
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however, that we are asking peoples to accept and endorse 
principles – popular sovereignty and property rights– that, albeit 
widely shared by the international society, might still be perceived 
by them as being imposed upon them from ‘outside’. This is an 
objection not only to the feasibility of the Clean Trade scheme 
but also to its desirability, from the point of view of a statist 
account of justice. 
Wenar himself would certainly agree that peoples’ political 
problems are for them to solve.27 He would be reluctant to ask 
these societies to share and endorse a principle of political justice 
that is imposed on them from the outside. Yet, he seems to want 
to convince us that long-term gains will prevail over short-term 
shortcomings if resource-cursed societies are able to embrace the 
principles supported by the Clean Trade scheme - those of 
popular sovereignty and individual property rights. These 
principles will enable them to become liberal-democratic regimes 
and full participants of the global Clean Trade framework. This 
seems to suggest that the long-term goal of the theory is for us in 
the West to trade (globally) only with liberal societies.  
If my understanding of Wenar’s argument is correct, there 
appears to be a problem of consistency between the envisaged 
implementation of the Clean Trade scheme and its anti-
paternalist premises. In my view, Wenar fails to recognise the 
form of pluralism that characterises the international Society of 
Peoples. Famously, in his theory Rawls proposes an account of 
institutional decency aimed at including non-liberal, non-
democratic constitutional republics (which he calls ‘decent 
hierarchical societies’) in – what he calls - the Society of 
Peoples.28 Rawls does not provide a clear definition of decency, 
 
27 Ibid., p. 324. 
28 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples. 
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but suggests that it might be understood as a kind of weak 
reasonability.29 Rawls’s notion of ‘decent peoples’, however, has 
important implications for the idea of international toleration, for 
the kind of pluralism that characterises the international society 
will inevitably be reflected in a diversity of political forms, some 
of which may be non-liberal democracies but which still satisfy 
the conditions that justify their recognition as ‘equal participating 
members in good standing of the Society of Peoples.’30 
The ideas of decency and decent political orders significantly 
influence Rawls’s overall statist design and, especially, his minimal 
account of human rights and the contested idea of duty of 
assistance. In the ideal theory, Rawls is resistant to the idea that 
liberal peoples’ foreign policy could be based on incentives aimed 
at forcing other people to become more liberal. He defends a 
strong principle of self-determination that enables decent peoples 
‘to decide their future for themselves.’31 In this vein, Rawls 
assumes that liberal and decent peoples should be committed to 
the protection of a very restricted group of what he calls ‘urgent 
rights’ that include ‘freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty 
(but not equal liberty) of conscience, and security of ethnic 
groups from mass murder and genocide.’32 In the non-ideal part 
of the theory, then, Rawls clarifies how the Society of Peoples 
should react to special situations that occur in the international 
arena. He distinguishes two further kinds of societies: an ‘outlaw 
state’, which is either internally repressive (violating the human 
rights of its citizens) or externally aggressive, and a ‘burdened 
society’, which is characterized by what Rawls calls ‘unfavourable 
 
29 Ibid., p. 67.  
30 Ibid., p. 59. 
31 Ibid., p. 85. 
32 Ibid., p. 79. 
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conditions.’33 Liberal peoples are not asked to tolerate the former, 
as they have a right to self-defence, but they ought not to 
intervene in the internal affairs of the latter. In this specific case, 
Rawls envisages a special duty of assistance which is aimed at 
supporting these societies: ‘peoples have a duty to assist other 
peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their 
having a just or decent political and social regime.’34 Although the 
extent of this duty is debatable, Rawls suggests that it should be 
limited to the goal of developing ‘decent’ institutions that protect 
the basic human rights of its members.  
Wenar doesn’t expressly relate his Clean Trade to Rawls’s duty 
of assistance, but it is possible to recognise important similarities 
between the two theories, especially with regard to their 
commitment to anti-paternalism. Although it is not clear whether 
‘resource cursed societies’ would fall under the Rawls’s category 
of ‘burdened societies’ or ‘outlaw states’, my impression is that 
they could be both. Wenar distinguishes between failing states 
‘where public accountability is absent’ from those societies where 
institutional weakness prevents them from becoming full liberal 
societies.35 He therefore argues that by adopting the policies 
envisaged by the Clean Trade western societies ‘will disengage 
commercially from resource-exporting countries where public 
accountability is absent and will support public accountability in 
countries where it is weak.’ He adds that this will not create a 
problem for political legitimacy since a Clean Trade scheme will 
not be pursued by military intervention or via a direct action in 
these countries; it should rather be based on a soft-policy based 
on incentives that will enable these peoples to take democratic 
 
33 Ibid., p. 105ff. 
34 Ibid., p. 37. 
35 Leif Wenar, Blood Oil, p. 281. 
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control of their resources.36 Yet, the Clean Trade scheme is far 
more demanding than Rawls’s duty of assistance. It asks not only 
that these societies develop institutions that support basic human 
rights and peace – say, decent institutions. They ought also to 
show a strong commitment to the liberal principles of popular 
sovereignty and property rights.  
Consider for example the case of Venezuela, a constitutional 
republic committed to basic human rights and to the principle of 
popular sovereignty of its resources, which is a pillar of chavismo. 
In addition, this regime is committed to a certain degree of 
political pluralism. In the presidential elections of 2013 following 
the death of Hugo Chávez, Nicolás Maduro defeated his more 
moderate opponent, Henrique Capriles, by a slim margin (only 
1.5 per cent). This result was deeply contested by the opposition 
and threw into doubt the legitimacy of the whole democratic 
process (McCarthy and McCoy, 2013).37 Contrast this with 
President Chávez’s openness to political pluralism and the system 
of cooperative relationships that he built with his moderate 
opponents between 2006 and 2012.38 This attitude strengthened 
Chávez’s political legitimacy and popular support39 – yet his 
 
36 Ibid., p. 282. 
37 Michael McCarthy and Jennifer McCoy “The limits of legacy: the post-
Chávez challenge and electoral legitimacy,” Americas Quarterly, Summer 2013, 
available at http://www.americasquarterly.org/the-limits-of-legacy-post-
chavez-challenge (accessed 29 October 2017). 
38 According to McCarty and McCoy (ibid.), ‘From 2006 to 2012, the 
government and the opposition established a working relationship that 
effectively bolstered the electoral system’s legitimacy, as demonstrated by 
public opinion polls and record-high citizen participation rates.’ 
39 Jones Owen, ‘Hugo Chavez proves you can lead a progressive, popular 
government that says no to neo-liberalism,’ Independent, 8 October 2012, 
availabel at http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/hugo-chavez-
 
Philosophy and Public Issues – Tyranny, Democracy, and Economy 
 92 
political regime relied on a robust refusal of the liberal principle 
of property rights: in line with its socialist premises, chavismo is 
based on the idea that national resources belong to the 
population and the government has the right to revoke the 
ownership of private firms or individuals in the name of the 
Venezuelan people. The refusal of the liberal principle of 
property rights is perhaps the most problematic aspect of chavismo 
from a liberal-democratic perspective. But should liberal peoples 
thus support a foreign policy aimed at incentivising Venezuelan 
people to become more liberal and to accept and support a 
political liberal regime committed to liberal property rights? My 
impression is that Venezuela, at least under Chávez, falls within 
the category of a decent society and so liberal peoples ought to 
tolerate this regime in the Society of Peoples. Not so in Wenar’s 
eyes: in his view, Venezuela represents one specific case of 
resource-cursed society where public accountability is still weak. 
He argues that ‘citizens are at least partly free – they have some, 
but not enough, power over their natural assets.’40 In his view, the 
consequence of adopting the Clean Trade scheme would be the 
transition of Venezuela from a partial to a full liberal democratic 
regime, which is committed to the protection of individual 
property rights. 
 
III 
Resource Pwnership and Popular Sovereignty: What Has 
Been Left Out? 
A further issue with Wenar’s theory refers directly to the 
normative basis of resource ownership. More specifically, it is not 
clear on what grounds Wenar justifies the very principle of 
                                                                                                                           
proves-you-can-lead-a-progressive-popular-government-that-says-no-to-neo-
liberalism-8202738.html (accessed 17 October 2017). 
40 Leif Wenar, Blood Oil, p. 321. 
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popular sovereignty of resources. In line with modern statist 
tradition, Wenar seems to take for granted that states should own 
their natural resources by virtue of their jurisdiction over a 
specific territory.41 In this respect, he still relies on the standard 
view, widely supported by international norms and covenants,42 
according to which the modern state can properly work only if it 
wields control over its territory. However, as Wenar puts it, this 
control should be based not on the principle of ‘effectiveness’ but 
on the democratic principle of popular sovereignty. But why 
should a specific group, say a national population, own the rights 
over a territory’s wealth? Blood Oil leaves this question 
unanswered.  
Yet, the issue of who is entitled to the control over and/or 
benefit from natural resources is very controversial, and the 
impetus for significant political conflicts in several countries. We 
are constantly confronted with situations in which the principle 
of popular sovereignty is opposed to the claims of other groups, 
such as indigenous peoples or national and ethnic minorities. 
Consider, for example, the case of Brazil. In this country, a 
conflict arises between the claims of the urban poor who argue 
that their poverty should be addressed through the exploitation 
of the resources of the Amazon, and the claims of Amazonian 
indigenous tribes who want to maintain control over the 
resources of their region.43 This kind of problem might become 
 
41A.J. Simmons, “On the Territorial Rights of States,” Philosophical Issues: Social, 
Political and Legal Philosophy, 11 (2001), pp. 300−326. 
42 See for instance the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties 
of States (art. 1), according to which states are defined ‘as entities with fixed 
territories (and permanent populations) under government control and with 
the capacity to enter into relations with other states’. 
43 On this case see also Margaret Moore, “Natural resources, territorial rights 
and global distributive justice,” Political Theory 40(2012), pp. 84–107. 
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even more pressing in resource-cursed societies where competing 
claims for the control of territory and resources among different 
ethnic groups are very often at the root of civil strife and 
violence. An appeal to the principle of popular sovereignty seems 
unlikely to be of much help in adjudicating the dispute between 
these groups. We would need a normative theory to justify why a 
certain group has a sovereign right over a territory and its 
resources.  
In conclusion, while we saw above that the Clean Trade 
scheme seems to ask ‘too much’ from the point of view of an 
anti-paternalist account of justice, here it seems that the theory is 
leaving out ‘too much’ in terms of the normative basis of national 
resource ownership. Wenar may respond to this that, again, it is 
not for ‘us’ to adjudicate these sorts of disputes; we should leave 
it to the Brazilians to decide. Yet, my impression is that by 
implementing the Clean Trade rules with the Brazilian 
government, we would in fact be presupposing a defence of a 
certain idea of national resource ownership that is not adequately 
justified by the theory. 
Luiss University 
